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INTRODUCTION

Among the many cases decided every year by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, relatively few relate to trademark law.
Unlike patent law and other substantive areas over which the Federal
Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction, the court's jurisdiction over
trademark law arises only in appeals from the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) and in appeals that otherwise fall within the
Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction—such as appeals involving
both patent and trademark issues.' In 2012, of the over 700 opinions
issued by the court,^ only thirteen—eleven precedential^ and two
nonprecedential*—related to trademark law. Thus, under two
percent of the court's opinions related to trademark law last year.
But what the Federal Circuit lacks in quantity it makes up for in the
importance of the issues, since the court addresses specialized
trademark registration issues that are rarely addressed by other
appellate courts. Of the thirteen trademark opinions, twelve began
as proceedings before the PTO's Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

1. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006).
2. This was determined from a search of Federal Circuit decisions in the
Westlaw database, excluding orders.
3. Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Disney Enters., 702 F.3d 640 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re
Fox, 702 F.3d 633 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Miracle Tuesday, LLC, 695 F.3d 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2012); DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247
(Fed. Cir. 2012); Lens.com, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 686 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2012); Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Société des Produits Nesde S.A., 685 F.3d 1046
(Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Becton, Dickinson & Co., 675 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re
The Chamber of Commerce, 675 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Bridgestone Ams. Tire
Operations, LLC v. Fed. Corp., 673 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In reViterra Inc., 671
F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
4. Willis V. Can't Stop Prods., Inc., 105 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(per curiam); 3M Co. v. Mohan, 482 F. App'x 574 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

2013]

2012 TRADEMARK LAW DECISIONS

993

(TTAB)/ and one began in district court, in a case that also involved
patent law issues.®
The Federal Circuit issued another nine orders in trademark
cases—one summary affirmance issued without an opinion/ four
remands for cases that were settled or were otherwise rendered moot
during the course of the appeal,* and four transfers to regional
circuits hased on the Federal Circuit's lack ofjurisdiction.^
Meanwhile, in 2012, the other twelve circuits issued approximately
seventeen opinions on trademark issues, while state courts of appeal
issued roughly eight.'" Thus, although trademark law falls within the
Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit is far from the only
appellate court deciding trademark issues. But since the Federal
Circuit is the only appellate court hearing appeals from the TTAB,''
5. Slesinger, 702 F.3d at 641; Fox, 702 F.3d at 634; Willü, 105 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1578; Miracle Tuesday, 695 F.3d at 1341; DuoProSS, 695 F.3d at 1249; Lens.com, 686
F.3d at 1377-78; Midwestern, 685 F.3d at 1048; Becton, 675 F.3d at 1369; Chamber of
Commerce, 675 F.3d at 1298; Bridgestone, 673 F.3d at 1332; Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1359;
Coach Sen^s., 668 F.3d at 1360.
6. iM, 482 F. App'x at 576.
7. In re CoUen IP Intellectual Prop. Law, P.C., 485 F. App'x 434, 434 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (mem.) (per curiam).
8. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. AFP Imaging Corp., No. 2012-1260, 2012 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22650, at *l-2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 1, 2012) (per curiam); Tempur-Pedic
Mgmt., Inc. V. FKA Distrib. Co., 481 F. App'x 615, 615 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In reAlvogen
IP Co. S.A.R.L., No. 2012-1305, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12847, at *1 (Fed. Cir. June
21, 2012) (per curiam); Greene v. Pitka, No. 2012-1277, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS
12836, at *1 (Fed. Cir. June 21, 2012); see also Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. AFP
Imaging Corp. {Rolex I), 480 F. App'x 998, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (dismissing the
appeal), vacated. No. 2012-1260, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 22650 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 1,
2012).
9. SIBU, LLC V. Bubbles, Inc., No. 2012-1651, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 24204, at
*l-2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 21, 2012), transferring to no. 13-4001 (10th Cir. docketed Jan. 3,
2013); Select Exp. Corp. v. Jack Richeson & Co., No. 2012-1122, 2012 U.S. App.
LEXIS 6637, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 2, 2012), transferring to No. 12-11761 (11th Cir.
docketed Apr. 5, 2012); Mine O'Mine, Inc. v. Cálmese, 470 F. App'x 886, 886 (Fed.
Cir.), affd, 489 F. App'x 175 (9th Cir. 2012); Joy Techs., Inc. v. N. Am. Rebuild Co.,
No. 2012-1061, 2012 WL 6054761, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 6, 2012) (per curiam),
transferred to^o. 12-2622 (3d Cir. dismissed Sept. 6, 2012).
10. These figures were determined from a search of the Wesdaw database, within
Westlaw's "Trademarks" key number, 382T. While these numbers appear to be
somewhat low based on a separate search for the word "trademark" and a review of
the cases found, they are merely intended to be an approximation. See, e.g., Christian
Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 212 (2d Cir.
2012) (protecting Christian Louboutin's trademarked red soles to the extent that the
soles contrast in color with the shoe's upper components), affd per curiam, 709 F.3d
140 (2d Cir. 2013); Prime Home Care, LLC v. Pathways to Compassion, LLC, 809
N.W.2d 751, 762-63 (Neb. 2012) (holding that the registered trade name
"Compassionate Care Hospice" had acquired secondary meaning and that the
competitor name "Compassionate Care Hospice of Nebraska" would create a
likelihood of confusion).
11. After receiving an adverse TTAB decision, a party can appeal to either the
Federal Circuit or a district court, 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (2006), but it is more common to
appeal to the Federal Circuit.
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it is generally the only reviewer of trademark registration issues, while
the other appellate courts generally review issues relating to a party^'s
ability to use a mark.'^
As the Federal Circuit explains in its internal operating procedures,
cases are randomly assigned to panels of three judges."'^ But once the
panel has heard the case, the judges select the author amongst
themselves, led by the presiding judge.'* Thus, unlike panel
assignments, the authoring assignments are not random. This year,
of the thirteen opinions in trademark cases. Judge O'Malley authored
significantly more than any other judge, writing four of the opinions
as well as participating in the one per curiam panel opinion.'^ The
remaining authorship fell more or less evenly among the court's
other judges.^'' Judge O'Malley is the only Federal Circuit judge who
has also served as a district court judge, hearing trademark cases
bound for both the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit.'^ Given this unique background among the Federal
12. See, e.g.. Miller's Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale House, LLC, 702
F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012) (determining whether one ale house violated the
trademark rights of another ale house by adopting a similar "name, decor, and . . .
floor plan"); World Entm't Inc. v. Brown, 487 F. App'x 758, 759-60 (3d Cir. 2012)
(considering a trademark-infringement case brought by one production company
against another).
13.

U.S.

COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT,

INTERNAL

OPERATING

PROCEDURES § 3.1 (2008), avaifaefe a/http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/rulesof-practice/IOP.pdf
14. Id. § 8.2.
15. See In re Miracle Tuesday, LLC, 695 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2012); DuoProSS
Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In
re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph
Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Willis v. Can't Stop Prods.,
Inc., 105 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
16. Of the other opinions. Judge Rader wrote two. Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v.
Disney Enters., 702 F.3d 640 (Fed. Cir. 2012); 3M Co. v. Mohan, 482 F. App'x 574
(Fed. Cir. 2012). Judges Reyna, Dyk, and Linn each wrote one opinion plus a full or
partial dissent. Sksinger, 702 F.3d at 646 (Reyna, J., dissenting); In re Fox, 702 F.3d
633 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Dyk,J.); Lens.com, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 686 F.3d 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (Linn, J.); Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Société des Produits Nestle
S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); InreBecton, Dickinson & Co., 675 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Linn,
J., dissenting); In re The Chamber of Commerce, 675 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Reyna,J.). Finally, Judges Bryson, Clevenger, and Newman each wrote one opinion.
Midwestern, 685 F.3d 1046 (Bryson, J.); Becton, 675 F.3d 1368 (Clevenger, J.);
Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC v. Fed. Corp., 673 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Newman, J.).
17. See Kathleen M. O'Malley, Circuit fudge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED.
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/kathleen-m-omalley-circuit-judge.html

(last visited Apr. 22, 2013) (indicating that Judge O'Malley presided over 100 patent
and trademark cases during her sixteen years on the Northern District of Ohio
bench). Indeed, a search of the Northern District of Ohio's CM/ECF database
reveals that Judge O'Malley presided over forty-one trademark cases as a district
court judge. See CM/ECF Database, U.S. DiST. COURT FOR THE N . DIST. OF OHIO,
https://ecf.ohnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/iquery.pl (query "Nature of Suit" is "840
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Circuit judges, her relatively frequent authorship of trademark
opinions may be no coincidence. Federal Circuit watchers should
keep an eye open for more trademark opinions from Judge O'Malley.
In 2012, the court affirmed most of the lower tribunals' decisions,
reversing only two'** and vacating one in part.'^ As discussed further
below, the court heard a wide variety of trademark cases. The issues
underlying the cases included the PTO's refusal to register a mark,^"
opposition and cancellation proceedings at the PTO,^' and an
infringement trial at the district court.^^ The Federal Circuit
addressed several substantive issues including those that involve
comparing two marks (likelihood of confusion, dilution, and
infringement) and the use or character of individual marks (use in
commerce, abandonment, functionality, descriptiveness, and
scandalous matter).^'* The court also addressed procedural issues
such as collateral estoppel,'^'* evidentiary rulings,^-^ the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial,^*^ and the award of attorneys' fees."
This Article discusses each of the Federal Circuit's thirteen
trademark cases in 2012. The case discussions are grouped by the
cases' primary issue, although other issues are also discussed within
the discussion of the relevant case.

(Trademark)" and search results for instances of "KMO" as the presiding judge) (last
visitedApr. 22, 2013).
18. DuoProSS, 695 F.3d at 1249; Bridgestone, 673 F.3d at 1332.
19. Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1360.
20. Fox, 702 F.3d at 634; Miracle Tuesday, 695 F.3d at 1341; Midwestern, 685 F.3d at
1048; Becton, 675 F.3d at 1369; Chamber of Commerce, 675 F.3d at 1298; Viterra, 671 F.3d
at 1359.
21. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 702 F.3d at 642; Willis v. Can't Stop Prods., Inc., 105
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (per curiam); DuoProSS, 695 F.3d at
1249; Lens.com, 686 F.3d at 1377-78; Bridgestone, 673 F.3d at 1332; Coach Servs., 668
F.3datl360.
22. 3M Co. V. Mohan, 482 F. App'x 574, 576 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
23. See Fox, 702 F.3d at 640 (scandalous matter); Willis, 105 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1578 (abandonment); Mirack Tuesday, 695 F.3d at 1341 (descriptiveness); DuoProSS,
695 F.3d at 1249 (descriptiveness); Lens.com, 686 F.3d at 1378 (use in commerce and
abandonment); Midwestern, 685 F.3d at 1048 (likelihood of confusion); 3M, 482 F.
App'x at 576 (infringement); Becton, 675 F.3d at 1369 (functionality); Chamber of
Commerce, 675 F.3d at 1298 (descriptiveness); Bridgestone, 673 F.3d at 1332 (likelihood
of confusion); Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1359 (likelihood of confusion); Coach Servs., 668
F.3d at 1360 (likelihood of confusion and dilution).
24. See Slesinger, 702 F.3d at 642.
25. See Miracle Tuesday, 695 F.3d at 1341; DuoProSS, 695 F.3d at 1251; Midwestern,
685 F.3d at 1048; Becton, 675 F.3d at 1381; Chamber of Commerce, 675 F.3d at 1298;
Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1360.
26. See 3M, 482 F. App'x at 578.
27. See id. at 576-77.
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1. Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC v. Federal Corp.
In Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC v. Eederal Corp.,^^ the

Federal Circuit reversed a TTAB decision that had dismissed
Bridgestone's opposition to registration of the MILANZA mark for
tires.^^
Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC, owned
registrations for the POTENZA and TURANZA marks for tires.^°
Bridgestone opposed Federal Corporation's application to register
the MILANZA mark for tires on the ground of likelihood of
confusion as to source.^' The TTAB concluded that confusion was
not likely because, although Bridgestone's and Federal's goods were
the same and were sold to the same consumer class, MILANZA was
"not similar to the POTENZA and TURANZA marks, and . . . the
marks POTENZA and TURANZA had not achieved significant
consumer recognition independent of the BRIDGESTONE mark."^^
The Federal Circuit reversed the TTAB's decision that POTENZA
and TURANZA were not independently strong marks.^^ The court
first noted that the fame of an opposer's mark plays a significant role
in a likelihood-of-confusion analysis.^'' Bridgestone persuaded the
TTAB that its POTENZA and TURANZA marks were inherently
distinctive, but the TTAB found that the marks were not strong or
famous because they had been used with the accompanying
BRIDGESTONE mark.^^ The Federal Circuit clarified that "[a]
unique arbitrary word mark does not lose its strength as a trademark
when the manufacturer is identified along with the branded
product."'^^ Because Bridgestone extensively showed its advertising,
media publicity, and critical acclaim for the two tire brands, the court
agreed that "concurrent use of the BRIDGESTONE mark d[id] not
diminish the status of POTENZA and TURANZA as strong marks for
tires."37

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

673 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1332.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
37. Id.

at 1332-33.
at 1334, 1336.
at 1334.
at 1336.
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Having found the POTENZA and TURANZA marks independently
strong, the court found that the MILANZA mark would likely cause
consumer confusion as to source.^^ Noting that newcomers carry a
heavy burden to avoid consumer confusion, the court stated: "In
light of the identity of the goods, the lengthy prior use of POTENZA
and TURANZA, the market strength of the POTENZA and
TURANZA marks, and the similarities of words, sounds, and
connotation with MILANZA, sufficient similarity ha[d] been shown as
would be likely to cause consumer confusion."^^ Thus, the Federal
Circuit reversed the TTAB's decision and sustained Bridgestone's
opposition.*
2. Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC
In Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC,'^^ the Federal Circuit

affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the TTAB its
decision involving the COACH mark as used for standardized testing
study materials.'*'^ Triumph Learning LLC, a publisher of K-12
instructional and study materials, filed use-based applications for a
COACH word mark, a stylized COACH mark, and a COACH mark
and design mark for educational computer software and printed
materials.''-''

Coach
Triumph claimed it had adopted the COACH mark for its products
in 1986, and that after the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,*^ it
significantly expanded its marketing and enjoyed substantial
commercial success.^"' Coach Services, Inc. (CSI), the well-known
fashion company, sells a wide variety of "accessible luxury" products.
38. /¿.at 1337.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1332.
41. 668F.3dl356(Fed. Cir. 2012).
42. Id. at 1360.
43. M at 1360-61.
44. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 20 U.S.C).
45. CoacÄ 5ÉTOÍ., 668 F.3d at 1360.
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such as handbags, luggage, clothing, and other accessories in its 400
retail stores, department stores, and online.^^
CSI opposed Triumph's three COACH marks, alleging likelihood
of confusion and dilution and arguing that the marks were merely
descriptive when used on educational and test-preparation
materials.^^ The TTAB dismissed CSI's opposition."*^ Specifically, the
TTAB found no likelihood of confusion or dilution, and determined
that, although Triumph's COACH marks were merely descriptive, the
marks had acquired secondary meaning.*^ As described below, the
Federal Circuit found no error in the TTAB's likelihood-of-confusion
and dilution decisions, but, because of certain evidentiary errors, the
court disagreed with the TTAB's acquired-distinctiveness analysis and
thus remanded for further proceedings on that issue.^°
On appeal, CSI made several evidentiary and substantive
challenges to the TTAB's findings.'^' As an evidentiary matter, CSI
argued that the TTAB erroneously excluded corporate annual
reports that CSI tried to submit through a notice of reliance.^'^ The
2000-2008 annual reports showed CSI's annual sales figures and
advertising and promotion expenditures for its COACH products
and, thus, were potentially relevant to determining the strength of
CSI's marks.^^ The court examined the relevant Trademark Rules of
Practice governing inter partes trademark proceedings and TTAB
decisions and found that the TTAB did not abuse its discretion when
it excluded those reports."^"* Specifically, the court explained:
"Historically, corporate annual reports were not considered printed
publications available to the general public and thus were not
admissible via a notice of reliance without any authentication.""^^ But
in 2010, the TTAB in Safer Inc. v. OMS Investments Inc.^^ held that a

document printed from the Internet identifying its publication date
or ''date that it was accessed and printed, and its source" could "be

admitted into evidence pursuant to a notice of reliance.'"^' The
TTAB, however, found—and the Federal Circuit in Goach Services
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 1361.
Id. at 1362.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1363.
Id.
Id. at 1363-65.
Id. at 1363.
94 U.S.P.Q..2d (BNA) 1031 (T.T.A.B. 2010).
Coach Serus., 668 F.3d at 1363-64 (quoting Safer, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039).
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agreed—that the Safer holding did not save CSI because its annual
reports were not printed from the Internet and the annual reports
did not include the online source, date accessed, or other identifying
information.^* Thus, they were not self-authenticating under Safer.^'^
CSI tried to alternatively argue that deposition testimony of CSI's
former Vice President and General Counsel corroborated the annual
reports, but the court disagreed, finding that the deponent did not
see or authenticate the annual reports during her deposition.^"
Further, the court noted that the sales and advertising figures the
deponent quoted were not limited to the United States.^'
The Federal Circuit next analyzed CSI's challenge to the TTAB's
decision that Triumph's COACH mark for standardized test
preparation materials would not likely confuse consumers. CSI
argued that the TTAB improperly balanced the factors from In re
E.I. DuPont DeNemours äf Co.,*"'^ namely by according insufficient
weight to the fame of CSI's COACH mark, "the identical nature of
the parties' marks," the parties' overlapping goods and consumers,
and "lack of sophistication of the parties' customers."®^ The court
rejected CSI's arguments and found that substantial evidence
supported the TTAB's findings.^"*
Initially, the court noted that the TTAB correctly found CSI's mark
famous for purposes of likelihood of confusion.'''^ CSI submitted
evidence of annual sales, advertising figures, unsolicited publicity.
58. 7d. at 1364-65.
59. M a t 1365.
60. Id. at 1364-65.
61. M at 1365.
62. 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973). The DuPont court held that the following
factors should be considered in a likelihood-of-confusion analysis:
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. (2) The
similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the g o o d s . . . described in an
application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in
use. (3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade
channels. (4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are
made, i.e. "impulse" vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing. (5) The fame of
the prior mark. (6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on
similar goods. (7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion. (8) The
length of time during and the conditions under which there has been
concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion. (9) The variety of
goods on which a mark is or is not used . . . . (10) The market interface
between applicant and the owner of a prior mark . . . . (11) The extent to
which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark on its
goods. (12) The extent of potential confusion . . . .
(13) Any other
established fact probative of the effect of use.
Id. at 1361.
63. Coach Serus., 668 F.3d at 1366.
64. Id.
65. W. at 1367.
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articles "refer[ing] to the renown of its products," and a March 2008
internal brand awareness study showing "a high level of awareness of
the COACH brand for women between the ages of 13-24."^'^
However, other factors the TTAB examined "dispel [led] any
likelihood of confusion between the parties' marks."^^
Regarding the similarity of the marks, the court looked at the
marks' "appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression."®^ Despite the undisputed similarity of the marks'
appearance and sound, the marks' differing connotations and
commercial impressions favored Triumph."^ Specifically, "Triumph's
COACH mark, when applied to educational materials, brings to mind
someone who instructs students, while CSFs COACH mark, when
used in connection with luxury leather goods, . . . brings to mind
traveling by carriage."™ Thus, the marks' distinct commercial
impressions nullified their identical sound and appearance.^'
As to other DuPont factors, the Federal Circuit found that the
similarity of the goods, channels of trade, and classes of customers
weighed against any likelihood of confusion.'^ CSI offered little
support—and the court found none—that its goods and Triumph's
educational materials overlapped.^^ Further, the court found that
Triumph only marketed products "through catalogs, direct mail, and
personal sales representatives."^^ Finally, the court agreed with the
TTAB that Triumph's targeting of educational professionals charged
"with responsibility for purchasing educational materials" would
outweigh any potential overlap in the classes of purchasers for the
parties' separate products.^^ The court, weighing the DuPont factors
de novo, agreed with the TTAB that consumers would not likely
confuse the parties' respective COACH marks.^"^
The Federal Circuit then affirmed the TTAB's decision that CSI's
COACH mark was not famous for purposes of proving dilution.^^
The court first noted that under section 43 (c) of the Lanham Act,™
66. Id.
67. M at 1367-68.
68. Id. (quoting In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361
(C.C.P.A. 1973)).
69. /¿.at 1369.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1369-71.
73. Id. at 1369-70.
74. Id. at 1370.
75. Id. at 1370-71.
76. Id. at 1371.
77. Id. at 1376.
78. 15 U. S.C. §1125(c) (2006).
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CSI had to prove that its COACH mark was famous prior to
Triumph's filing date.™ Under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act
of 2006,*° famous marks are "widely recognized by the general
consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of
the goods or services of the mark's owner."^^ Importantly, the court
explained, "dilution fame is difficult to prove."*^ This proved true for
CSI. The court examined CSI's evidence and found that it
introduced insufficient evidence of dilution fame.^*
CSI argued that its sales and advertising figures for 2000-2008,
numerous federal trademark registrations, unsolicited media
attention, joint marketing efforts, and brand awareness survey all
demonstrated enough fame for a claim of dilution.** The court
rejected each in turn. Referring to its evidentiary ruling, the court
refused to consider the 2000-2008 sales and advertising figures.*^
Proof of federal trademark registration, according to the court, "is
not conclusive evidence of fame" but merely relevant to the fame
inquiry.*® Regarding CSI's media attention, the court acknowledged
that CSI certainly "achieved a substantial degree of recognition."*'
But, the court explained that "many of the articles submitted [were]
dated a^gr Triumph filed its registration applications and thus d[id]
not show that CSI's mark was famous prior to the filing date."**
Further, the court noted, many articles merely included one of CSI's
COACH products along with brands from other companies.*^ The
court also found that CSI's evidence lacked testimony regarding the
success of joint marketing efforts.®" As to CSI's brand awareness
study, although the study demonstrated significant brand awareness
among women ages 13-24, "it provided no evidence of brand
awareness among women generally, or among men."^' Further, CSI
conducted its 2007 survey long after Triumph filed its applications.®^

79. Coach Serus., 668 F.3d at 1372.
80. Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(f),

1063(a) ,1064, 1092,1125(c), 1127).
81. 15U.S.C. §1125(c)(2)(A).
82. Coach Senis., 668 F.3d at 1373.
83. « . a t 1373-76.
84. Id. at 1373-74.
85. Id. at 1374.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.

Id. at 1375.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The court's decision regarding dilution serves as a reminder to all
plaintiffs bringing dilution claims: the burden to show fame that rises
to the level necessary for a dilution claim is high—higher than the
burden for showing likelihood-of-confusion fame^^—and plaintiffs
must properly submit sufficient evidence demonstrating their own
mark's fame among the general consuming public from before the
opposing party's filing date.
Finally, CSI also argued that Triumph's COACH mark was merely
descriptive, and Triumph challenged CSI's standing to make that
argument.®^ The court found that CSI satisfied the two judicially
created standing requirements: (1) a "real interest" and (2) a
"reasonable basis" for believing Triumph's marks, if registered, would
cause harm in the form of confusion or dilution.^^ Thus, the Federal
Circuit found that CSI also had "standing to assert a claim on
descriptiveness grounds" because standing required only that CSI
show a personal stake; after that, it could present any theory that
would prevent the harm at issue.^® Turning to CSI's mere
descriptiveness claim, the court held that substantial evidence
supported the TTAB's finding that CSI sufficiently described
tutoring.^^ But the court vacated the TTAB's holding that Triumph
demonstrated its COACH marks had acquired secondary meaning.^*
Specifically, the TTAB should not have dismissed CSI's evidence of
book and software titles unaffiliated with Triumph that included the
word "coach" merely because they were published after Triumph
filed its applications.^^
The court explained:
"Acquired
distinctiveness and buyer recognition is to be tested in an opposition
proceeding as of the date the issue is under consideration. The filing
date is not a cutoff for any evidence developing after that time."'""
Therefore, the court instructed the TTAB on remand to reconsider
the issue of Triumph's "substantially exclusive use" of COACH, a
requirement for establishing secondary meaning."" Additionally, the
court found that no testimony authenticated Triumph's advertising
93. Id. at 1373 ( 'While fame for dilution 'is an either/or proposition'—it either
exists or does not—fame for likelihood of confusion is a matter of degree along a
continuum." (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005))).
94. M. at 1376.
95. M at 1377.
96. Id.
97. M at 1378.
98. Id. at 1380.
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting Target Brands, Inc. v. Hughes, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1676, 1681
(T.T.A.B. 2007)).
101. Id.
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documents supporting its pre-2003 use of COACH.'*'^ Thus, the court
instructed the TTAB to address the weight, if any, to give to those
documents. ^"^
3.

In re Viterra Inc.
In In re Viterra Inc.,^'^* the Federal Circuit found that substantial
evidence supported the TTAB's finding that consumers would
likely confuse the applied-for XCEED mark with the registered XSEED mark.^"'
Viterra, Inc., an international agricultural
business, attempted to register XCEED for "agricultural seed."'"®
The TTAB refused registration, finding a likelihood of confusion
with the X-SEED mark for "agricultural seeds," which was "registered
in special form as a word and design mark."""

X-Seed, Inc. claimed the colors "as a feature of the X-Seed Mark" and
disclaimed protection for the term "seed" apart from the mark.^"^
The TTAB considered the DuPont factors relating to similarity of
the marks, trade channels, and goods in its likelihood-of-confusion
analysis.^"^ The TTAB found consumer confusion likely because of
the identical nature of the goods, the fact that the goods traveled in
the same trade channels, the marks' virtually identical-sounding
pronunciations, and the fact that both marks played on the word
"exceed" to convey a laudatory suggestion."" Regarding marks'
similarity of appearance, the TTAB considers all reasonable
manners in which the words of a mark could be depicted under a
"reasonable manners" standard.'" Applying this standard, the

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id. at 1380-81.
67:I F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1359.
Id.
Id. at 1359-60.
Id.
Id. at 1361-62.
Id. at 1360.
Id.
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TTAB found a "reasonable variation of XCEED could include a
large capital letter 'X' followed by 'ceed' in smaller letters, which
would resemble the X-Seed Mark.'"'^ Viterra appealed the adverse
decision to the Federal Circuit and the parties waived oral
argument.''^
On appeal, the Federal Circuit focused solely on the similarity of
the marks. ^'* Because neither the application nor registration
restricted the channels of trade or classes of purchasers, the "goods
and services [we] re presumed to travel in the same channels of trade
to the same class of^ purchasers.""^ Further, Viterra conceded that
the goods were identical; thus, those issues were not before the
court.''^ Viterra made three arguments as to the dissimilarity of the
X-SEED mark and its XCEED mark."' Viterra primarily focused on
the appearance of the marks, asserting that the X-SEED mark's
allegedly distinctive design and color claims, "render[ed] it visually
different from its XCEED mark.""® Viterra further argued that the
marks were phonetically different and had different connotations."'
The court focused its attention on Viterra's first argument as to the
dissimilarity of the appearance of the marks. ^^^ The court first noted
that this DuPont factor—similarity of the marks—examined "the
similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression."'^'
Further, the court explained, the verbal portion of composite marks
containing both words and a design is "most likely to indicate the
origin of the goods."'^^ Viterra asked the court to explain how
standard character marks should be distinguished from marks
registered as designs under the likelihood-of-confusion analysis.'^*
Specifically, Viterra asked the court to reexamine Citigroup Inc. v.
Capital City Bank Group,^^* decided after the TTAB's appealed-from
decision, where the Federal Circuit rejected the "reasonable
112. Id.
113. M at 1361.
114. M a t 1362.
115. Id. (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268
(Fed. Cir. 2002)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. M at 1363.
119. M at 1362.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361
(C.C.P.A. 1973)).
122. Id. (quoting CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
123. M at 1363.
124. 637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011 ).
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manners" standard.'^^ The court, noting it lacked authority to
"readdress" Citigroup, denied Viterra's request for several reasons.
First, the court agreed with the TTAB, explaining that "a standard
character mark is not limited to any particular font, size, style, or
color."^'^'' Second, the court explained that the court in Citigroup, in
rejecting the "reasonable manners" test, actually broadened the
"range of marks to be considered in the DuPont analysis when a
standard character mark is at issue."^^' Thus, the TTAB's use of the
"reasonable manners" test was harmless error because it found a
likelihood of confusion under a more restrictive test.^^® Third, the
court rejected Viterra's procedural attempt to avoid Citigroup by
"arguing that Citigroup involved an inter partes opposition
proceeding, whereas th[e current] appeal derive [d] from an ex parte
examination."^^^ The Federal Circuit found no reason for such a
distinction, noting that both types of cases derived from the Lanham
Act and that the DuPont factors, which also derived from the same
section and originated in the ex parte context, applied in both types
of cases. ^^° The Federal Circuit carefully noted, however, that it left
"for future cases to determine the appropriate method of comparing
design marks with standard character marks."'^^
The court next responded to Viterra's argument that the TTAB
misconstrued the dominant portion of the X-SEED mark. Viterra
asserted "that the dominant portion of the X-Seed Mark actually is
the stylized letter 'X' and cannot include '-Seed,' particularly because
the registrant used a hyphen to separate 'X' from 'Seed' and
disclaimed the term 'Seed.'"^^^ The court disagreed, first finding that
the design feature and literal portion of the mark were not entirely
distinct.'*^ Second, the court reaffirmed its previous decisions
"holding that the verbal portion of a word and design mark likely will
be the dominant portion."^^^ Finally, the court reminded Viterra that
"in the ultimate determination of similarity of the marks, the [TTAB]
must consider the [marks] in [their] entirety, including the
disclaimed portion."^^^
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

erriI,

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at

67lF.3datl363.

1364.
1365 &n.3.
1364.
1364-65.
1365.
1366.
1367.
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Finally, the Federal Circuit summarily dismissed Viterra's
remaining arguments. First, the two marks sounded similar; even if
the marks were intended by their owners to be pronounced
differently, consumers would not necessarily do so. Second,
substantial evidence supported the TTAB's finding that consumers
would reasonably perceive the two marks in a similar manner.'^®
While the appeal focused solely on the similarity of the marks, the
court reiterated the fact that the DuPont factors not argued on appeal
weighed heavily in the registrant's favor. Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the TTAB's refusal of registration on the ground of
likelihood of confusion.'^'
4. Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Société Des Produits Nestle S.A.
In Midwestern Pet Eoods, Inc. v. Société Des Produits Nestle S.A.,"* the

Federal Circuit considered an appeal from a TTAB decision denying
registration of Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc.'s WACGIN' STRIPS mark
for pet food and edible pet treats.'•''® The court found that substantial
evidence supported the TTAB's likelihood-of-confusion finding, and
a majority found that the TTAB did not procedurally err in admitting
certain evidence.'*"
Midwestern filed an intent-to-use application seeking to register the
mark WAGGIN' STRIPS for pet food and edible pet treats.'*' Société
Des Produits Nestle S.A.—owner of the registered BEGGIN' STRIPS
mark for pet treats—opposed registration, arguing that there was a
likelihood of confusion between the two marks.'''^ During prehearing
discovery. Nestle made various objections to Midwestern's document
requests and interrogatories.'*^ Nestle agreed to produce "at a
mutually agreeable time and place" certain nonprivileged documents
and further "agreed to reconsider its responses if Midwestern would
narrow its requests."'*"* Importantly, after entry of a protective order,
Midwestern did not facilitate production of the documents Nestle

136. Id.
137. Id. (noting that the TTAB also gave heavy weight to the fact that the goods at
issue were identical and that, when this is the case, "the degree of similarity necessary
to support a conclusion of likely confusion declines" (quoting Century 21 Real Estate
Corp. V. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992))).
138. 685F.3dl046(Fed. Cir. 2012).
139. H. at 1048.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1048-49.
144. Id. at 1049.
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had agreed to produce, narrow its requests, or move to compel
production.''*''
The TTAB rejected Midwestern's objections to certain exhibits
submitted as part of Nestle's advertising, sales, and marketing
evidence, finding that Midwestern placed too much reliance on
Nestle's discovery responses and should have understood Nestle
might later rely on such.''"' Notably, the TTAB held that Midwestern
needed to file a motion to compel production if it wanted to test
Nestle's objections to discovery requests.'*' Thus, the TTAB ruled
that Midwestern waived its right to object to the evidence by failing to
file a timely motion.''"*
Midwestern argued on appeal that the TTAB should have sustained
its objection to Nestle's admission of its advertising, sales, and
marketing evidence because Nestle failed to produce these
documents in response to Midwestern's discovery requests.'''^ The
majority, over a sharp dissent by Judge Dyk on this limited issue,
disagreed and held that the TTAB clid not abuse its discretion when it
refused to strike Nestle's evidence."^" The majority noted that TTAB
procedures were amended in 2007 to require mandatory initial
disclosures.'" Accordingly, the majority asserted that because Nestle
filed its opposition prior to this amendment, it was not required to
specify its evidence or identify its witnesses before trial.'^^ The
majority further explained that TTAB precedent and procedures in
effect before 2007 required Midwestern to move to compel
production after Nestle objected to its discovery requests in order to
test Nestle's responses.'^'' The majority noted that in some cases,
absent a motion to compel, the TTAB would bar introduction of
evidence that had not been produced in discovery but explained that
in those instances, "the withholding party represented that it had no
relevant documents that would be used at trial or refused to allow
access to the requested documents.'"^* On appeal. Nestle objected to
the production requests.'*^

145.
146.
147
JlTt / .
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
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Judge Dyk, in a thorough dissent, felt that the majority's holdings
confiicted with "the advisory committee notes and with decisions
interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which [had] been
adopted for [TTAB] proceedings," specifically the majority's holdings
that Nestle had no duty to produce evidence it intended to rely on at
trial and that Midwestern's failure to compel production waived its
right to object to the admission of evidence at trial.'^® Regarding the
mandatory disclosure of evidence. Judge Dyk agreed with the
majority that the 2007 amendment did not apply, but he believed
that even though the TTAB had not yet adopted the mandatory
disclosure requirement, "a party is required, under the pre-2007
document production provisions, to produce the documents on
which it intends to rely if so requested during discovery."^^^ The
majority's response stated that the TTAB retained discretion to adopt
discovery rulings and that it had not fully adopted the federal rules
regarding discovery. ^''^
Judge Dyk also disagreed with the majority's holding that
Midwestern waived its right to object to the admission of Nestle's
evidence at trial.'^^ He first noted that while federal rules and the
TTAB's own rules "required a motion to compel as a prerequisite for
sanctions for failure to comply with an initial discovery request, there
is no such obligation for failure to supplement responses to discovery
requests under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)."'^'' Judge Dyk
pointed out that Rule 26 (e) applied to the TTAB proceeding
pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 2.120 and explained that Rule 26(e) required
"timely supplementation without a motion."'®' He further doubted
whether Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure
(TBMP) section 523.04, which the majority relied on in part to find
waiver, applied to supplementation, but explained that it did not
carry the force of law regardless.'®^ As a result. Judge Dyk would have
remanded the case for consideration of an appropriate sanction.'®"*
156. Id. at 1054 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157. Id. at 1056. Judge Dyk cited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) (1) (A) in
support of his position: "[P]arties are required to provide 'without awaiting a discovery
request,' inter alia, 'the name . . . of each individual likely to have discoverable
information . . . that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses . . .
[and] a c o p y . . . of all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible
things that the disclosing party . . . may use to support its claims or defenses.'" Id. (second
alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a) (1) (A)).
158. M at 1051 (majority opinion).
159. Id. at 1056-57 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1057.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1058.
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Substantively, the majority affirmed the TTAB's finding that
Midwestern's WAGGIN' STRIPS and Nestle's BEGGIN' STRIPS
marks were conñisingly similar.'®* As an initial matter, the court
explained that Nestle could rely on evidence of fame that postdated
Midwestern's application to demonstrate likelihood of confusion.'*^^
Next, the court noted the relevant factors that the TTAB focused on
to find likelihood of confusion: "the fame of Nestle's mark; the
similarity of the goods, the channels of trade, and purchasers; the
conditions of sale; the similarity of the marks; and Midwestern's
intent.""''' The court first rejected Midwestern's argument that
Nestle's mark deserved only a narrow scope of protection because the
TTAB found that Nestle's mark was not famous."^^ Because Nestle
had used the BEGGIN' STRIPS mark since 1988 to advertise, market,
and sell products "throughout the nation," and further, because
Nestle had expended considerable sums on advertising, "Nestle ha[d]
covered a broad spectrum of advertising media in seeking to promote
the mark.""^** Thus, the court found that although the BEGGIN'
STRIPS mark was not famous, it was distinctive and deserved broad
protection.'*''*
The Federal Gircuit next compared the marks themselves,
examining their "appearance, meaning, sound, and impression."'™
Both marks were in the standard character format, so design
differences were not relevant; moreover, the court explained that
"the two marks ha[d] the same format, structure, and syntax."''"
Both marks consisted of two words, the second word—although
disclaimed by both parties—was identical, and "[t]he first word in
each mark end[ed] with GGIN'."'^^ Although "begging" and
"wagging" are different verbs, the court explained that "the verb in
both marks consists of a single syllable, and the marks have generally
similar pronunciations, cadences, and intonations."'^^ Additionally,
the court found that the marks were "used in connection with
identical products, and that the products would be sold in the same

164. Id. at 1052-53 (majority opinion).
165. /¿.at 1052.
166. Id. (citing In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361
(C.C.P.A. 1973)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1052-53.
169. Id. at 1053.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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channels of trade and to the same consumers."^'^'' Finding that the
marks were "sufficiently similar in their overall commercial
impression," the court held that substantial evidence supported the
TTAB's finding that consumer confusion was likely.'''^
B. Infringement
I.

3M Co. V. Mohan
In 3M Co. V. Mohan,^''*' the Federal Circuit, in a nonprecedential
opinion, affirmed a district court's grant of partial summary
judgment, finding that Pradeep Mohan, who was in business selling
stethoscopes, willfully infringed 3M Company and 3M Innovative
Properties Company's (collectively 3M) trademarks, and affirmed the
award of attorneys' fees and costs for 3M.^"
3M alleged that Mohan sold on the Internet stethoscopes that
infringed 3M's patent and trademarks. The trademarks included the
following marks: LITTMANN, LITTMANN QUALITY Stylized L,
Stylized L, CARDIOLOGY III, MASTER CARDIOLOGY, 3M, and
MASTER CARDIOLOGY configuration mark.'™ One of Mohan's
websites presented words and images similar or identical to several of
those trademarks.'™ 3M further argued that the case was exceptional
due to Mohan's intendonal acdons, necessitating attorneys' fees
under the Lanham Act.'**" Mohan raised several counterclaims.'^'
The district court granted 3M's motion for partial summary judgment
that, inter alia, Mohan's counterclaims be dismissed, and denied
Mohan's motion for partial summary judgment that 3M's MASTER
CARDIOLOGY configuration mark and CARDIOLOGY III word
mark were both invalid.'**^ After a bench trial, the district court found
that Mohan willfully infringed 3M's trademarks, "that a permanent
injunction was warranted, and that this was an exceptional case
justifying the award of 3M's attorneys' fees."'®^
On appeal, Mohan argued that the district court erred in granting
3M partial summary judgment, violated his Seventh Amendment
174. Id.
175. Id. The court did not find the lack of survey evidence detrimental to Nestle's
position in light of ample evidence showing likelihood of confusion. Id. at 1054.
176. 482 F. App'x 574 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
177. Id. at 576.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 577.
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right to a jury trial, and erred in finding both that Mohan willfully
infringed 3M's trademarks and that the case was "exceptional."'^"*
Interestingly, at the district court, Mohan had sought summary
judgment of invalidity, but, in response, 3M argued that the court
should hold the mark not invalid as a matter of law.'**"^ The district
court held that the mark was valid, noting that it could enter
summary judgment sua sponte as long as Mohan had an opportunity
to present his arguments.'**^
In its decision regarding Mohan's appeal of trademark validity, the
Federal Circuit agreed that the trademarks were valid.'^"^ The court
reasoned that Mohan presented no evidence showing that the marks
were not suggestive, and further, that Mohan "failed to produce any
meaningful evidence" showing the marks became generic and were
abandoned."*^ Thus, the court upheld the district court's summary
judgment regarding the trademark validity.^^^
The Federal Circuit also found that the district court did not
violate Mohan's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial by entering
summary judgment sua sponte.'*' Noting that the nature of remedies
determines the right to a jury trial, the Federal Circuit explained that
the district court properly denied the claim by 3M for statutory
damages, determined by the court, under the Lanham Act, because
this would have violated Mohan's Seventh Amendment rights.'®'
Thus, according to the court, because only equitable remedies
remained, "and the Seventh Amendment does not apply in suits
seeking only equitable relief," the district court did not violate
Mohan's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.'^^
Regarding trademark infringement, the Federal Circuit found
that the district court did not clearly err in finding a likelihood of
confusion between 3M's and Mohan's marks.'^^ Strong survey
evidence and emails in which Mohan apologized to consumers
regarding the source of the goods that he sold supported this
conclusion.'®'' Mohan argued fair use under the Lanham Act, but
184.
185.
2010),
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
3M Co. V. Mohan, No. 09-1413, 2010 WL 3200052, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 9,
affd, 482 F. App'x 574.
/¿. at*7, *9.
5M, 482 F. App'x at 578.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 579.
Id.
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the court affirmed the district court's findings that Mohan's uses
constituted counterfeiting under the statute and that Mohan
intended to free ride on 3M's goodwill with its customers.'^^
Finally, the Federal Gircuit determined that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in finding the case exceptional to award
attorneys' fees.'®^
C

Use in Commerce and Abandonment

1. Lens.com, Inc. v. 1-800 Gontacts, Inc.
In Lens.com, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc.,^^^ the Federal Gircuit

affirmed the TTAB's summary judgment in a cancelladon proceeding
that Lens.com, Inc. had abandoned its LENS mark.'^* Lens.com, an
online retailer of contact lenses and similar products, was the
assignee of a registradon for the mark LENS "in connection with
computer software featuring programs used for electronic ordering
of contact lenses in the field of ophthalmology, optometry and
opticianry."'^^
1-800 Gontacts, Inc. instituted a cancellation
proceeding alleging, inter alia, abandonment "because Lens.com
never sold or otherwise engaged in the trade of computer
software."^"" The TTAB granted 1-800 Gontacts' motion for summary
judgment, finding that Lens.com's software was not a "good in

A federal trademark registration of a mark may be cancelled if the
mark has been abandoned.^"^ As a general matter, a mark is
abandoned if its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume
the use.^"^ As the court explained, section 45 of the Lanham Act
(codified as 15 U.S.G. § 1127) provides that a "mark shall be deemed
to be in use in commerce on goods when . . . the goods are sold or
transported in commerce."'^°'^ Because Lens.com did not sell software, the
Federal Gircuit examined the appeal on "whether Lens.com's
software [wa]s a 'good' that [wa]s 'transported in commerce.'"^"''
Lens.com claimed that software distributed to end-users via the
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 579-80.
Id. at 580.
686 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1378.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
M a t 1379.
15 U.S.C. §1127(2006).
Lens.com, 686 F.3d at 1380 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
Id.
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Internet satisfied the "use in commerce" requirement and felt that
there was no public awareness requirement for use.^°® 1-800 Contacts
countered, arguing that Lens.com abandoned the mark because it
did not offer software to consumers and that any software was merely
ancillary to Lens.com's online retail services.^"' Further, 1-800
Contacts argued, consumers were unaware of any downloaded
software and thus "could not possibly associate the LENS mark with a
source of software."^''*'
The Federal Circuit first explained several "use in commerce"
jurisdictional requirements before delving into the realm of Internet
services.^"^ First, the court stated that where goods are "transported"
in commerce, courts require public awareness of the use.^'" Second,
the court explained that "use in commerce" requires that the goods
not be merely "the conduit through which [the applicant] renders
services."^'' Expanding on that notion, the court noted that an
article must have some "independent value apart from the services;"
otherwise "such article is not likely to be an independent good in
2'2

In the context of Internet services, the court noted that little
precedent existed on whether "an Internet service providers' software
[wa]s an independent good in commerce, or [wajs merely incidental
to the Internet services."^^'' The court explained that whether
consumers "associate a mark with software" requires a case-by-case
factual determination.^''* The court stated that several factors should
be considered, including whether the software: "(1) is simply the
conduit or necessary tool useful only to obtain applicant's services;
(2) is so inextricably tied to and associated with the service as to have
no viable existence apart therefrom; and (3) is neither sold separately
from nor has any independent value apart from the services."^'^
The Federal Circuit distinguished this case from a U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit case. Planetary Motion, Inc. v.
Techplosion, Inc.,^^^ and found that the LENS mark was not "use[d] in

206. M at 1379.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1380.
210. Id.
211. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In reS'holders Data Corp., 495 F.2d 1360,
1361 (C.C.P.A. 1974)).
212. Id. (quoting S'holdersData, 495 F.2d at 1360).
213. M at 1381 (emphasis omitted).
214. Id. at 1381-82 (emphasis omitted).
215. M at 1382.
216. 261 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2001).
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commerce in association with software."^''^ According to the Federal
Gircuit, the Eleventh Gircuit panel in Planetary Motion held that
Goolmail Software "was sufficiently transported in commerce"
because the software was the primary product, the website posted a
filename showing the GOOLMAIL mark, and evidence showed that
consumers actually associated the mark with the software.^'^ In
contrasting the LENS mark from the GOOLMAIL mark, the court
explained that "the LENS mark [wa]s used only in connection with
the sale and transportation of contact lenses via the Internet," and the
record did not show that "consumers ha[d] any reason to be aware of
any connection between the LENS mark and Lens.com's software."^'^
Thus, the Federal Gircuit affirmed the TTAB's judgment on
abandonment.^^"
As a final matter, the court rejected Lens.com's argument that the
TTAB "erroneously relied solely on Lens.com's specimens of use" to
cancel the mark.^^' The court clarified that the TTAB "properly
relied on the entire application file as directed by the [TTABJ's
regulations," which state that the entire registration file automatically
becomes ''part of the record [in a cancellation proceeding] ."^^^
2. Willis V. Gan't Stop Productions, Inc.
In Willis V. Can't Stop Productions, Inc.,^^^ a nonprecedential opinion,

the Federal Gircuit affirmed the TTAB's summary judgment that
Gan't Stop Productions, Inc. (Gan't Stop) did not abandon its
VILLAGE PEOPLE marks and that those marks were not generic.^^*
The plaintiff was Karen L. Willis, the wife of the Village People's
original lead singer, Victor Willis.^^^ Gan't Stop owned two registered
VILLAGE PEOPLE service marks, "for entertainment services
rendered by a musical and vocal group, and pre-recorded
phonograph records, audio cassettes, audio tapes and compact discs
featuring music and vocals."^^^ Gan't Stop also owned a design miark.

217. ¿«wi.eow, 686 F.3d at 1382-83.
218. /d. at 1381-82.
219. M at 1382.
220. « . a t 1383.
221. Id.
222. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Cold War Museum, Inc. v. Cold
War Air Museum, Inc., 586 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
223. Willis V. Can't Stop Prods., Inc., 105 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(per curiam).
224. Id. at 1580.
225. M at 1578.
226. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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depicting the Village People members, for "entertainment services,
namely, live performances by a musical and vocal
^^' ^

h
Before Mr. Willis left the Village People group, he signed an
employment agreement whereby "he acknowledged that [Can't Stop]
own[ed] all rights to the name 'The Village People' and agreed not
to use the name for any purpose."'^'^*' After Can't Stop refused to
license the VILLAGE PEOPLE mark to Mrs. Willis and her husband,
Mrs. Willis filed petitions to cancel Can't Stop's marks.^^'^
In somewhat unclear fashion, Mrs. Willis made several arguments
before the TTAB.^* Specifically, Mrs. Willis alleged that Can't Stop
misrepresented the source of its goods and services as originating
from Can't Stop rather than from Mr. WiUis.^"*^ Further, Mrs. Willis
argued that the marks were generic and abandoned.^^^ The TTAB
struck the misrepresentation-of-source claims from the pleadings
because it found that the claims were legally insufficient.^^^
Additionally, the TTAB granted summary judgment, holding that
Mrs. Willis did not submit evidence to support her claim that the
marks were generic.'^''* The TTAB further granted summary
judgment that Can't Stop "did not abandon the 'VILLACE PEOPLE'
mark in connection with entertainment services or the design
mark."^^^ But the TTAB found a genuine issue of fact "as to whether
[Can't Stop] stopped using its [VILLAGE PEOPLE] mark in
connection with [audio recordings]."'^^^ Mrs. Willis appealed all
adverse
^*^

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
/ d at 1578-79.
Id.
Id. at 1579.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Federal Circuit sided with the TTAB and struck down each of
Mrs. Willis's arguments.^^^ First, the court determined that Can't
Stop's marks were not generic or abandoned.^^^ Mrs. Willis, arguing
pro se, claimed the marks "merely identif[ied] groups of people
living in a community. "^'*° The court explained that "Mrs. Willis
offered no evidence that the term 'Village People' [wa]s used as a
generic term for musical recordings or performances."^*' Regarding
her abandonment claim, Mrs. Willis argued primarily "that the group
d[id] not qualify as a 'musical and vocal group' because its members
lip-sync [ed] and d[id] not play musical instruments."^*^ The court
noted that Mrs. Willis and her husband admitted that they saw "the
Village People perform in connection with those marks," and Mrs.
Willis's argument, at most, merely "reflect[ed] on the quality of
entertainment [Can't Stop] offer[ed]."^*^ Finally, the court found
that Mrs. Willis's fraud and misrepresentation-of-source claims were
properly dismissed by the TTAB as legally insufficient.^** In the end,
cursory allegations and a simple lack of evidence doomed Mrs. Willis.
D. Eunctionality

1. In re Becton, Dickinson & Co.
In In re Becton, Dickinson àf Co.,^*^ the Federal Circuit affirmed the
TTAB's decision to refuse registration of a closure cap design for
blood collection tubes, finding the mark functional as a whole and
therefore ineligible for trademark protection.^*® The decision came
from a divided panel, with Judge Clevenger writing for the majority^*^
and Judge Linn dissenting.^*® Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD),
a medical technology company, sought to register the mark for
"closures for medical collection

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 1580.
Id.
Id. at 1579.
Id. at 1580.
Id. at 1579.
Id. at 1580.
Id.
675 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1369-70.
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1377 (Linn,!., dissenting).
Id. at 1370 (majonty opinion).
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BD's trademark application "assert[ed] acquired distinctiveness based
on five years of substantially exclusive and continuous use in
commerce. "^^°
At the PTO, the examining attorney refused to register BD's
closure cap designs under the Lanham Act, finding that the cap
design was funcdonal and that, "even if non-functional, the cap
design [wa]s a non-distincdve configuration of the goods."^^' In
response to the examining attorney's request for additional
information, BD submitted a number of patents, advertising samples,
and website printouts showing caps from other companies.^^^
After the examining attorney issued a final refusal, BD
simultaneously filed a Notice of Appeal to the TTAB and a Request
for Reconsideration.^^^ The examining attorney denied the initial
reconsideration request but accepted BD's second Request for
Reconsideration, which "proposed [a] more detailed mark
description."^^* BD and the TTAB disagreed over the proposed mark:
the TTAB found that "the features described in the amended
descripdon d[id] not embody the mark in its entirety."^^^ Thus, the
TTAB determined "that the proposed mark included all elements
shown in the drawing except the tube, which was shown in dotted
The TTAB applied the four factors from In re Morton-Norwich Products,
c}'^'' and found the cap design—considered as a w h o l e ^ ^ ^
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 1371.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982). The four factors are:
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First, a finding of functionality was favored by the existence of a utility
patent that described the utilitarian advantages of the cap's circular
opening and ribs.^^^ Second, BD's advertising pubUcized several
utilitarian advantages of the cap design, namely, the ridges on the
cap's side that provided a secure grip, the fianged lip at the bottom
that prevented users from popping off the cap, and the hooded cap
design that prevented "the user's gloves from getting pinched
between the stopper and tube when closing the tube."^^" Third,
based on the evidence, the TTAB found no alternative designs for
collection tube caps.^®' Finally, with scant evidence on the fourth
Morton-Norwich factor—motivation of the manufacturing technique
on design aspects—the TTAB accorded it no weight in finding
functionality.^''^ Therefore, the TTAB held that "the closure cap
configuration mark, considered in its entirety, [waJs functional. "^^^
Notably, the TTAB "gave less weight to less prominent features,"
finding them "incidental to the overall adoption of those features and
hardly discernible when viewing the mark."^®'' The TTAB additionally
found that BD failed to establish acquired distinctiveness and
ultimately refused registration.'"^®^
BD presented two arguments on appeal to the Federal Circuit.^^
First, BD argued that the TTAB committed legal error by discounting
the significance of the closure cap's nonfunctional elements.^^^
Second, BD argued that substantial evidence did not support the
TTAB's Morton-Norwich analysis.^^*

(1) the existence of a utility patent disclosing the utilitarian advantages of
the design; (2) advertising materials in which the originator of the design
touts the design's utilitarian advantages; (3) the availability to competitors of
functionally equivalent designs; and (4) facts indicating that the design
results in a comparatively simple or cheap method of manufacturing the
product.
Value Eng'g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing MortonNorwich, 671 F.2d at 1340-41).
258. Becton, 675 F.3d at 1372.
259. M at 1371-72.
260. /¿.at 1372.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. In re Becton, Dickinson & Co., No. 77254637, 2010 WL 3164746, at *4
(T.T.A.B. July 27, 2010), affd, 675 F.3d 1368.
264. Becton, 675 F.3d at 1372. The TTAB relied on Textron, Inc. v. U.S. International
Trade Commission, 753 F.2d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1985), finding that nonfunctional features
do not affect the functionality determination where the overall design is functional.
JSecíoíi, 675F.3datl372.
265. 5eciow, 675F.3datl372.
266. Id. at 1373.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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BD's first argument revived its dispute with the TTAB over the
scope of the mark.^**** BD asserted that the scope of the mark was
modest, explaining that the cap's elongated shape, rib spacing, and
the relationship of those features to the cap as a whole was the mark
design.-^" Therefore, BD asserted that the TTAB should have
considered the nonfunctional elements in its functionality
determination.^'' The Eederal Gircuit majority, rejecting BD's
position, explained that "[wjhenever a proposed mark includes both
ifunctional and non-functional features, as in this case, the critical
question is the degree of utility present in the overall design of the
mark."^''^ Thus, the Morton-Norwich analysis "weigh [s] the elements of
a mark against one another to develop an understanding of whether
the mark as a whole is essentially functional and thus nonregistrable."^'^
Judge Linn dissented and explained that "[t]he proper inquiry is to
examine the degree to which the mark as a whole is dictated by
utilitarian concerns (functional or economic superiority) or is arbitrary
('without complete deference to utility')."^''* While Judge Linn agreed
that the degree of design utility must be considered—and de facto
functional features may be analyzed—to determine de jure
functionality, he felt that weighing individual elements against each
other ran "contrary to the consideration of the mark as a whole."^'"^
Regarding BD's second argument, the majority held that
substantial evidence supported the TTAB's Morton-Norwich analysis.^'®
Regarding the first factor, the majority found that one of BD's
patents disclosed "two prominent features of BD's mark: (1) the two
concentric circles at the top of the closure cap, which allow a needle
to be inserted, and (2) the ribs, which serve as a gripping surface."^"
BD argued, and Judge Linn agreed, that the patent did not actually
claim those features, but rather merely disclosed those features in the
patent's specification.^™ The majority, however, explained that the
Supreme Gourt, in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,^''^

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 1377 (Linn,J., dissenting) (quoting In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc
671 F.2d 1332,1343 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1376-77 (majority opinion).
277. Id. at 1375.
278. Id. at 1379 (Linn,J., dissenting).
279. 532 U.S. 23(2001).
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"d[id] not require that a patent claim the exact configuration for
which trademark protection is sought in order to undermine an
applicant's assertion that an applied-for mark is not de jure
funcdonal."^^° Eurther, the majority rejected BD's argument that its
design patents demonstrated nonfunctionality because the design
patents and BD's mark lacked identity, asserting that mere similarity
lacked sufficient evidentiary force to overcome the strong conclusion
that functional elements were present in BD's mark.^^^
As for the second Morton-Norwich factor, the mzijority found that
substandal evidence supported the TTAB's finding that BD's
advertising touted the utilitarian features of the cap design.^^^ Judge
Linn agreed with this point but argued that BD's adverdsing
supported a "finding of non-functionality based on the third MortonNorwich factor: the presence of alternadve designs."^^^ The majority
briefiy discussed the third factor, noting that once functionality is
established, consideradon of the availability of alternative designs is
not necessary.^^* Although acknowledging that rule, Judge Linn
noted that alternadve designs may nevertheless "be a legitimate
source of evidence to determine whether a feature is functional in
the first place."^^^
Additionally, the majority summarily dismissed the fourth
factor—whether the cap design results from simple or inexpensive
methods of manufacture—because BD presented scarce evidence on
this factor to the TTAB.^^® In his dissent, Judge Linn felt that the
majority nonetheless should have considered the evidence BD did
present. ^^^
Einally, the majority explained that the funcdonality doctrine
protects industry competition.^*^ Given that BD's competitors
included similar functional features on their cap products, "the
competitive need to copy the [cap's] functional features" reinforced
the conclusion that BD's proposed mark was

280. ¿eciow, 675F.3datl375.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1379 (Linn.J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 1376 (majority opinion).
285. Id. at 1380 (Linn, T., dissenting) (quoting Value Eng'g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp.,
278 F.3d 1268,1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
286. Id. at 1376 (majority opinion).
287. Id. at 1380-81 (LinnJ., dissenting).
288. Id. at 1376 (majority opinion).
289. Id.
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Descúptiveness

DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Medical Devices, Ltd.
In DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Medical Devices, Ltd.,^^° the

Federal Circuit bared its teeth and demonstrated its ability to reverse
the TTAB for lack of substantial evidence. The court overturned the
TTAB's decision not to cancel a design mark and word mark,
remanding the case with instructions to cancel both marks.^^^
DuoProSS Meditech Corp. and Inviro Medical Devices, Ltd. both
sold "medical syringes and needles . . . designed to prevent accidental
needle sticks."^^^ Inviro's products prevented needle sticks by
drawing the needle into the syringe barrel with the plunger and
snapping off the plunger to seal the needle inside the barrel.^®^
Inviro, appealing counterclaims filed against it by DuoProSS, had
registered two separate marks.^^* The first registration covered the
SNAP! design mark.^'''^

Snap/
The second registration covered SNAP SIMPLY SAFER in standard
characters.^^^ Inviro initially petitioned to cancel DuoProSS's
trademark registration for the BAKSNAP design mark for use with
safety syringes.^^' Inviro withdrew its petition, but DuoProSS
maintained its counterclaims to cancel several of Inviro's
registrations, namely, the two registrations on appeal and several
SNAP marks in typed format.^**^ The TTAB concluded that the SNAP
marks in typed format were merely descriptive and ordered
cancellation but declined to cancel the SNAP! design mark and the
SNAP SIMPLY SAFER word mark.^»» DuoProSS appealed the TTAB's
rulings as to the design mark and word
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

695 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
at 1251, 1257.
Id.
at 1249.
Id.
Id.
at 1250.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at 1250-51.
Id.
Id.
at 1251.
Id.

1022

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:991

The Federal Circuit first found that substantial evidence did not
support the TTAB's finding that DuoProSS failed to show that the
SNAP! design mark was merely descriptive.***" Initially, the TTAB
"improperly focused on only one portion of the mark when it
considered the mark's commercial impression."^"^ Second, the TTAB
lacked evidentiary support for its conclusion that DuoProSS failed to
prove descriptiveness.™'' Regarding the mark itself, the court
explained that the TTAB erroneously separated "the literal element
SNAP [from] the broken exclamation point."^"* The court explained
that "[w]hen determining whether a mark is merely descriptive, the
[TTAB] must consider the commercial impression of a mark as a
whole."^"^ The TTAB cannot "dissect" a mark into separate
elements.'"'® The court noted that the TTAB may examine the mark's
individual components, but it "ultimately must consider the mark as a
whole and do so in the context of the goods or services at issue."^''^
According to the court, after the TTAB found the SNAP element
descriptive and the exclamation point fanciful, it should have
considered "whether the entire mark . . . convey [ed] a commercial
impression that [wa]s merely descriptive to a consumer."^"^
Second, the court reprimanded the TTAB for not supporting its
conclusion that the design mark was more than descriptive with
satisfactory evidence.^"^ The TTAB thought that the exclamation
point merely "suggest[ed] the breaking of something, rather than a
syringe plunger specifically."^'" The court, emphasizing that a mark's
commercial impression "must be viewed through the eyes of a
consumer," found that the TTAB failed to show evidence "that a
consumer would have to employ imagination, thought, and
perception to determine that the mark was referring to the snapping
of a syringe plunger."^" Further, the court clarified that the proper
inquiry to determine whether a mark is merely descripdve "is whether
someone who knows what the goods and services are will understand

301. Id. (asserting that "the record supports no conclusion other than that the
mark ¿imerely descriptive" (emphasis added)).
302. Id. at 1252.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. /a. at 1253.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
311. Id.
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the mark to convey information about them."^'^ Given that Inviro's
instructions on how to disable needles depicted the design mark, and
that its website displayed with prominence both a broken plunger
and the word "Snap," the court noted that the TTAB's findings
supported the opposite conclusion.'"^
The Federal Circuit further held that substantial evidence did not
support the TTAB's finding that SNAP SIMPLY SAFER was not
merely descriptive, and additionally, that the TTAB "legally erred
when it concluded that puffery could render the mark more than
descriptive. "^'''
Again, the court reprimanded the TTAB for
"impos[ing] its own view" about the SNAP SIMPLY SAFER mark,
focusing on the words' alliteration and thus concluding, without
evidentiary support, that the commercial impression amounted to it
being more than merely descriptive.-^'^ As the Federal Circuit panel
read the record, it found only that the mark described safety, the
products' "most important advantage."^'^ Lastly, the court concluded
that the TTAB erred as a matter of law in finding that the "puffery" of
the SNAP SIMPLY SAFER mark made it more than descriptive.'''^
The court stated "that puffing, if anything, is mare likely to render a
mark merely descriptive, not less so."^'**
The Federal Circuit took this opportunity to remind the TTAB not
to substitute its own views about a mark for the commercial
impression that a mark conveys to a consumer. Additionally, the
court demonstrated that substantial evidence review, while
deferential, provides a potential avenue for relief.
2.

In re The Chamber of Commerce
In In re The Ghamber of Gommerce,^^'^ the Federal Circuit affirmed the
TTAB's refusal to register the mark NATIONAL CHAMBER on the
ground of mere descriptiveness.'^^" The U.S. Chamber of Commerce
(COC) sought to register the service mark NATIONAL CHAMBER in
two related applications.'''^' Both applications sought registration for
services all within the same class, "which generally encompasse[d]
312. Id. at 1254 (quoting In re Tower Tech, Inc., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1314, 1316-17
(T.T.A.B. 2002)).
313. Id. at 1254-55.
314. M. at 1255.
315. /d. at 1254, 1256.
316. M at 1255.
317. Id. at 1256.
318. Id.
319. 675 F.3d 1297 (Eed. Cir. 2012).
320. /d. at 1298.
321. Id.
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advertising and business-related services. "^^^ Specifically, the first
application sought registration for "providing online directory
information services[,] . . . providing information and news in the
field of business, . . . [and] administration of a discount program. "'^^
The second application sought registration for "business data
analysis" and "analysis of governmental policy relating to
businesses. . . for the purpose of promoting the interests of
businessmen and businesswomen."^^''
The TTAB, relying on
printouts from GOG's website and dictionary definitions of "national"
and "chamber," found that consumers would "immediately
understand NATIONAL GHAMBER, used in connection with
applicant's services . . . as conveying information about them," and
denied registration.^^^
On appeal, the Federal Gircuit briefiy discussed the law of
descriptiveness and found that substantial evidence supported the
TTAB's finding of mere descriptiveness.^'^*' The court explained that
"[d]escriptiveness must be evaluated 'in relation to the particular
goods for which registration is sought, the context in which it is being
used, and the possible significance that the term would have to the
average purchaser of the goods because of the manner of its use or
intended use.'"^^' Because GOG filed an intent-to-use application, it
did not—and could not—rely on secondary meaning or acquired
distinctiveness.^^*
As a threshold matter, GOG arguably conceded that "national"
meant nationwide in scope, "chamber" usually meant a chamber of
commerce, and "a chamber of commerce generally serves to promote
the interests of businesspersons in various ways."^^^ Importantly, the
court stated: "To decide this case, we need only find that
NATIONAL GHAMBER immediately conveys information about one
feature or characteristic of at least one of the designated services
within each of GOG's applications."''^''
Regarding the first
application, the court found NATIONAL GHAMBER descriptive of
online directory-information services because a GOG website printout
showed that its online directory, "provide [d] information to identify
322. Id. at 1298-99.
323. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
324. M at 1299.
325. Id.
326. /a. at 1300-01.
327. Id. at 1300 (quoting In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d 960, 963-64
(Fed. Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
328. Id.
329. /d. at 1301.
330. Id.
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chambers of commerce nationwide.'"*^' Regarding the second
application, the court found substantial evidence supported the
TTAB's mere descriptiveness finding.''^^ The court explained that
"business and regulatory data analysis services are within the scope of
traditional chambers of commerce activities," and "chamber" often
refers to "chamber of commerce."^^^ The court further reasoned that
NATIONAL CHAMBER also described the function of the former
service in the second application, namely, promoting interests of
businesspeople."*-'*
Although the court found the mark merely descriptive, it carefully
noted that it would not establish a broad general rule that all
traditional chamber-of-commerce services further business interests
and dius refused to hold "that NATIONAL CHAMBER [wa]s merely
descriptive of any nationwide service that [wa] s within a broad genus
of 'chamber of commerce services.'"''^^ That refusal did not help
COC here, as COC's mark merely had to immediately convey
knowledge of only one feature of only one designated service in an
application to doom applications for the proposed marks.^^^
As a final, procedural matter, the court briefiy "address [ed] COC's
contention that the TTAB's reasoning was so conclusory as to
preclude meaningful appellate review."*'*' The court reminded the
TTAB to expressly link its "evidentiary findings to the individually
recited services within the two applications" but ultimately found that
the TTAB's reasoning was sufficiently clear to satisfy the substantial
evidence standard of review.''^^
3. In re Miracle Tuesday, LLC
In In re Miracle Tuesday, LLC,^^^ the Federal Circuit affirmed the
TTAB's refusal to register a "primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive" mark.^**" Miracle Tuesday, LLC, a fashion company,
filed an intent-to-use applicadon seeking to register its JPK PARIS 75

331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. See id. (explaining that a mark is descriptive if it immediately conveys imparts
knowledge of a function of the service with which it is used).
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 1302.
338. Id.
339. 695 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
340. Id. at 1341; see infra text accompanying notes 346-47 (defming the limits of
such marks).
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mark and design for "sunglasses, wallets, handbags and purses, travel
bags, suitcases, belts, and shoes."^*'

PK

TD

PARIS

75

Jean-Pierre Klifa, a French citizen and manager of Miracle Tuesday,
lived in Paris for twenty-two years before moving to the United States
in 1986.^*^ While in Paris, Klifa, who also designed the goods at issue,
exhibited at two trade shows, although in his declaration in support
of his application, he did not identify which goods he exhibited.***
The examining attorney and the TTAB were not persuaded by these
facts to register the mark and design, and both found the mark
"primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive."***
Miracle Tuesday appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that the
TTAB made several errors in its refusal to register the mark under
section 2(e)(3) of the Lanham Act.**'' This section bars registration
"on the principal register if the mark, 'when used on or in
connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive of them.'"**® This provision
applies to marks where
(1) the primary significance of the mark is a generally known
geographic location; (2) the consuming public is likely to believe
the place identified by the mark indicates the origin of the goods
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

Id. at 1341.
Id. at 1342.
Id.
Id. at 1342-43.
Id. at 1343.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3) (2006)).
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bearing the mark, when in fact the goods do not come from that
place; and (3) the misrepresentation was a material factor in the
consumer's decision to purchase the goods.^''^
On appeal. Miracle Tuesday took issue with the TTAB's findings as
to the second and third elements of the reñisal.^*** In particular, it
argued that the goods were not generated in Paris, that the TTAB
applied an improper standard to determine that the word "Paris" was
deceptive, and that the determination ultimately failed to account for
material evidence.^*^
The Federal Circuit, responding to Miracle Tuesday's first
argument, clarified the law on association and origin of goods. The
second element of a Lanham Act section 2(e)(3) refusal—"whether
the public would reasonably identify or associate the goods sold
under the mark with the geographic location contained in the
mark'"*"^"—examines two questions. First, whether an association
exists between the goods and the identified place, known as the
"goods/place association," and second, "whether the applicant's
goods in fact come from that place."•''^' As to the goods/place
association analysis, the court explained that the PTO need not
demonstrate an actual association; rather, the PTO "need only
establish a reasonable predicate for its conclusion that the public would
be likely to make the particular goods/place association on which it
relies."^^^ Further, in cases involving goods, the Federal Circuit noted
that when a "place is known for producing the product," a
goods/place association may be inferred.^'"'' Here, the court found
that because Paris is famous for fashion and fashion accessories, and
"relevant purchasers are likely to think of Paris as a known source for
fashion accessories," sufficient evidence supported the TTAB's
determination that a goods/place association existed between the
listed goods and Paris.'''^''
Regarding the quesdon under section 2(e)(3) of whether the
goods in fact come from a place, the Federal Circuit clarified the law
on origin.•''^•'^ Goods must originate from the named place, but the
347. Id. (quoting In re Cal. Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. (quoting In re Save Venice N.Y., Inc., 259 F.3d 1346, 1353-54 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)).
351. Id.
352. Id. at 1543-44 (quoting In re Pacer Tech., 538 F.5d 1548, 1551 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
353. M. at 1544.
354. Id.
555. Id. at 1544-45.
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court explained that "[ojrigin can be predicated on factors other
than manufacture . . . where the circumstances justify such a
connection."*^'' Miracle Tuesday disagreed with the TTAB's "overly
restrictive" interpretation of "originates."*" The TTAB found "the
fact that Klifa lived and worked in Paris for twenty-two years"
unpersuasive.*^* Miracle Tuesday urged the Federal Circuit to
consider that Klifa "has a significant connection with Paris and that
customers are more interested in the designer's origin than the
origin of the goods themselves."*^^ Miracle Tuesday further pointed
to the fact that people at red carpet events care more about the
designer of celebrities' clothing than the place the clothing was
made.*^ The court, dismissing these arguments, explained that the
proper statutory inquiry is "whether there is a connection between
the goods and Paris—not between the designer and Paris."*^' Thus,
according to the court, that the designer lived in Paris long ago could
not justify a mark indicating the goods originated there.*®^ The court
further expounded on the origin requirement, noting that "there
must be some other direct connection between the goods and the
place identified in the mark."*^* Because Miracle Tuesday's goods
were designed in Miami and made in Asia, no current connection
between the goods and Paris existed.*^
Next, the court rejected Miracle Tuesday's argument regarding the
proper standard for materiality under the third element of a section
2(e)(3) refusal.*®"^ This element requires that "a substantial portion
of the relevant consumers . . . be materially influenced in the decision
to purchase the product or service by the geographic meaning of the
mark."*"*' The court explained that "evidence that the place is famous
as a source of the goods at issue" raises an inference favoring
materiality.*''' Miracle Tuesday argued that the TTAB applied the
wrong materiality standard and that the TTAB had to find that use of
356. Id. at 1344. The PTO at oral argument admitted that place of design, rather
than mantifacture, can sufficiently establish origin. Id. Further, the location of an
applicant's "headquarters or research and development facilities" might suffice to
ñnd origin. Id.
357. M a t 1345.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 1346.
366. Id. (quoting In re Spirits Int'l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
367. Id. (quoting In reLes Halles de ParisJ.V., 334 F.3d 1371,1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
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the word "Paris" actually deceived the public.^*'*' Noting that Miracle
Tuesday relied on a case that involved services, rather than goods,
however, the court responded that service marks required "a
heightened association between the services and geographic
location.'"*®^ For goods, on the other hand, evidence that the place is
famous for those goods sufficiently raises an inference of
materiality.^™ Again relying on the fact that Paris is famous for
fashion and design, the court found that "the geographic
misrepresentation in the mark is material and would deceive a
substantial portion of the relevant consumers regarding the source of
the goods outlined in the application."''^'
As a final evidentiary matter, the Federal Gircuit rejected Miracle
Tuesday's complaints that the TTAB did not consider various
scholarly articles about consumer purchasing decisions and
originating country issues.^^^ Noting the presumption that factfinders review all presented evidence, the court explained that merely
because the TTAB did not discuss all of the evidence did not indicate
that the evidence was not actually reviewed.^'"^
F.

Scandalous Matter

1. In re Fox
In In re Fox,^'^'^ the Federal Gircuit, in one of the more interesting
opinions of 2012, affirmed the TTAB's refusal to register a vulgar
mark that fell within the proscription of section 2 (a) of the
Lanham Act.^^"^ The applicant sought to register the words GOGK
SUGKER and a crowing rooster design for rooster-shaped
chocolate lollipops."®

368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

Id.

Id. at 1347.
Id.
Id.

/d at 1347-48.
Id. at 1348.
702F.3d633(Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 634.
Id. at 635.

1030

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:991

Marsha Fox sold her chocolate roosters primarily to fans of schools
using roosters as mascots—the University of South Carolina and
Jacksonville State University.*''
The TTAB refused registration, finding that the words, "when used
in connection with the applicant's products, create [d] a double
entendre: one meaning is one who performs fellatio; and the other
meaning is a rooster lollipop."*™ The TTAB concluded that the term
COCK SUCKER was vulgar and thus fell within section 2 of the
Lanham Act's prohibition on registration of scandalous matter.*™
The Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB's refusal and held that "a
mark that creates a double entendre falls within the proscription of
[section 2 of the Lanham Act] where, as here, one of its meanings is
clearly vulgar."***" Fox initially argued that the literal part of her mark
meant only "rooster lollipop."*^^ The court disagreed, first noting
that Fox herself conceded that "cocksucker" is a vulgar word in
normal parlance, and second asserting "that the distinction between
COCKSUCKER [one word] and COCK SUCKER [two words] is a
distinction without a difference."*^^
Alternatively, Fox asserted "that when a mark is a double entendre,
with one vulgar and one non-vulgar meaning, the PTO must
demonstrate that the public would 'choose' the non-vulgar
meaning."*^* The court explained that, as an initial matter, a mark's
377. Id.
378. In re Fox, No. 76315793, 2011 WL 6012204, at *3 (T.T.A.B. 2011), affd, 702
F.3d 633.
379. Id.
380. Fox, 702 F.3d at 634.
381. M at 637.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 638.
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vulgar meaning need not be the only relevant meaning; rather, "as
long as a 'substantial composite of the general public' perceives the
mark, in context, to have a vulgar meaning, the mark as a whole
'consists of or comprises. . . scandalous matter.'"*^* Thus, Congress
extended the prohibition on scandalous matter to marks that merely
included such matter.**'' The court distinguished an earlier case that
allowed registration of a mark, which was ambiguous because of two
alternative, nonvulgar meanings, explaining that in the present case,
"the conceded effect of the mark is to invoke a 'double meaning.'"*^^
The court further denied Fox's final argument that the PTO should
permit registration and rely on opposition proceedings for any public
objections to the mark.***^ The court noted its approval of this
approach where a mark's registrability was uncertain but ultimately
concluded that no such uncertainty existed in this case.*****
While the Federal Circuit denied Fox's registration of her mark,
the court reiterated the impact of its decision. The court explained
that its decision did not "preclude [] Fox from continuing to sell her
merchandise under the mark at issue, or from seeking trademark
protection for some other, otherwise registrable element of her
product's design, dress, or labeling."*'*'' The court's decision merely
denied Fox's ability to avail herself of the benefits of federal
registration for COCK SUCKER.*»"
IL

PROCEDURAL TRADEMARK ISSUES
A.

Collateral Estoppel

1. Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Disney Enterprises
In Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Disney Enterprises,^'^^ a Federal Circuit

majority affirmed the TTAB's dismissal of Stephen Slesinger, Inc.'s
(Slesinger's) cancellation and opposition proceedings due to
collateral estoppel.*^^ Decades of disputes in federal courts, state
courts, and the TTAB between Slesinger and Disney Enterprises, Inc.
384. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006), and In re The Boulevard Entm't, 334
F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
385. Id.
386. Id.\ see In re Mavety Media Grp., 33 E.3d 1367, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(differentiating between a double entendre and general ambiguity regarding the
word "tail").
387. Fox, 702 F.3d at 639-40.
388. Id.
389. «.at 639.
390. M at 640.
391. 702 F.3d 640 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
392. Id. at 642.
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over the trademark rights related to A.A. Milne's Winnie-the-Pooh
literary works preceded this appeal.*^*
A.A. Milne transferred merchandising rights for Winnie-the-Pooh
works to Slesinger in 1930.*^* Later, in 1961, Slesinger assigned those
rights to Walt Disney Productions.^'^^ The pardes' dispute in this case
stemmed from a 1983 agreement, which first revoked all previous
agreements and then transferred all of the right in the work back to
Slesinger.*^^ Slesinger then transferred at least certain rights back to
Disney.*®' In the dispute on appeal, Slesinger argued that it retained
rights in the Winnie-the-Pooh works, while Disney argued that
Slesinger assigned all rights to Disney.*^^
In a separate 1991 state court acdon, Slesinger alleged that the
1983 agreement gave Disney valuable rights in exchange for
royalties.*®® During these proceedings, Slesinger conceded that the
1983 agreement assigned all acquired rights to Disney.'*°'' In addidon,
Slesinger explained that the grant of all "further rights" was "a catchall designed to ensure that Slesinger was granting... all of the
additional commercial exploitation rights Slesinger acquired that
[we] re not specifically mentioned in the 1983 Agreement."*"^
Eventually, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the state trial
court's dismissal of Slesinger's claim.*"^ The parties' royalty dispute
continued in the Central District of California, where Slesinger
amended its complaint to allege trademark and copyright
infringement.*"* There, "Disney moved to dismiss the claim because
Slesinger had admitted in state court that Disney's uses of the Winniethe-Pooh characters were authorized . . . [, and because] Slesinger
retained no rights which Disney could infringe."*"** On cross modons
for summary judgment, the district court examined the agreement's
scope and noted that the pardes' conduct since 1983 "indicated the
Winnie-the-Pooh rights were transferred to Disney in the 1983
agreement."*"^
Specifically, Disney registered a number of
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
597. Id.
398. Id.
599. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. (quoting Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., No. 2:02-cv-08508,
2009 WL 3140439, at *4 (CD. Cal. Sept. 25, 2009)).
402. Id.
403. /a. at 645.
404. Id.
405. Id.
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trademarks and copyrights; Slesinger, in contrast, took no such
action.^"*" The district court further found "that Slesinger transferred
all of its rights . . . to Disney, and [could] not now claim infringement
of any retained rights."^"'
The current appeal before the Federal Circuit stemmed from
Slesinger's attempt to cancel Disney's applications to register several
marks "comprising the names or images of 'Pooh' and related
fictional characters."^°^ Slesinger claimed that the 1983 agreement
was a license and thus that Disney had no right to register the
marks."'"^ Disney viewed the agreement as an assignment and filed a
motion to dismiss.*''' The TTAB found that collateral estoppel barred
Slesinger's claims and granted Disney's motion, treating it as a
motion for summary judgment."*''
A majority of the Federal Circuit found that the TTAB properly
applied collateral estoppel to bar Slesinger's claim that the 1983
agreement was a mere license.'"^ The majority first laid out the four
elements required for collateral estoppel to bar a claim: "(1) a prior
action presents an identical issue; (2) the prior action actually
litigated and adjudged that issue; (3) the judgment in that prior
action necessarily required determination of the identical issue; and
(4) the prior action featured full representation of the estopped
party."*'^ On appeal, Slesinger conceded the first and fourth
elements.*'* The majority noted that the district court "litigated the
identical issue, the scope of the 1983 agreement, and Slesinger was
fully represented."*'^ The current appeal, and disagreement between
the Federal Circuit majority and Judge Reyna, dissenting, concerned
the second and third elements.
The majority and Judge Reyna strongly disagreed on the second
element: whether the district court actually litigated and decided the
critical issue. The majority rejected Slesinger's argument "that the
district court did not properly consider the critical issue on the scope
of the 1983 agreement."*'^ The majority explained that the district
406. Id.
407. Id. (quoting Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., No. 2:02-cv-08508,
2009 WL 3140439, at *4 (CD. Cal. Sept. 25, 2009)) (internai quotation marks
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

Id.
Id.
Id.
M a t 643-44.
/d. at 646.
M at 644.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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court thoroughly analyzed whether the 1983 agreement was a license
or an assignment, and that Slesinger maintained that the agreement
was a license.^'^ Slesinger argued that the district court's use of the
term "retained rights" in its ruling "implie[d] Slesinger licensed its
rights to Disney," that the district court did not use the word
"assignment," and that "its reference to the 'grant' or 'transfer'
support[ed] Slesinger's contention the 1983 agreement was a
license.'""® The majority disagreed with Slesinger and concluded that
the parties' conduct over the past several decades, and "the district
court's holding that the 1983 agreement represented 'a transfer from
[Slesinger] to Disney of all of [Slesinger]'s interests in the Pooh
characters,'" demonstrated that the district court found that Slesinger
"retained" no rights.^'^
Moreover, the majority felt it immaterial that the district court used
"transfer" and "grant" instead of "assignment," asserting that "it is the
court's ultimate 'judgment that matters,' not the language used to
discuss the court's rulings.""*^" Judge Reyna strongly disagreed,
seemingly elevating form over substance, and writing that the district
court's use of such language could reasonably refer to a license.'''^' In
Judge Reyna's view, reasonable doubt existed over whether the
district court actually decided the issue.''^^ Judge Reyna found the
district court's use of ambiguity particularly important, arguing that a
possible explanation for this ambiguity was that "the district court
found it unnecessary to actually decide the issue as long as it focused
on whether Disney had a legal right to use the Pooh trademarks.'"*'^*
Finally, the majority and Judge Reyna disagreed over whether the
district court judgment necessarily required a determination of the
issue of ownership. The majority viewed the district court's
ownership ruling as essential to its judgment because "the district
court had to determine this issue before deciding whether Disney's
uses of the Winnie-the-Pooh rights were infringing."*^* Similarly, the
TTAB had to determine Slesinger's ownership rights before it could
consider Slesinger's request to change the registrations to its
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 644-45 (quoting Milne ex rel Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., No. 2:02cv-08508, 2009 WL 3140439, at *4 (CD. Cal. Sept. 25, 2009)).
420. Id. at 645 (quoting Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 961 F.2d 245, 254
(D.C. Cir. 1992)).
421. Id. at 648 (Reyna, T., dissenting).
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 646 (majority opinion).
425. Id.
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Judge Reyna did not agree. He believed that "Disney could have
been authorized to use the Pooh trademarks under a license."*^^
Thus, "ownership" and "authorized user under a license" were both
rational bases to find noninfringement.''^'
CONCLUSION

Although the Federal Circuit does not routinely issue many
decisions on trademark law, its opinions address important issues,
particularly because the court addresses trademark registration issues
that are rarely addressed by other appellate courts. And, like the
Federal Circuit's other areas of jurisdiction, its trademark decisions
span the procedural gamut. Readers should keep an eye on the
court's trademark decisions in the future, as the court is sure to
continue to resolve new and interesting issues.

426. Id. at 648 (Reyna,J., dissenting).
427. M at 649.
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